A Sociological Approach to Cults

Culture In Trauma

A Basic Theory of the Origin of Cults

Throughout the 21^st century, unprecedented technological advance, economic catastrophe, mass migration and dislocation, war, and other powerful social disturbances have created the conditions for the accelerated growth and emergence of radical social movements. These movements have often been defined in terms of their inferior scale relative to larger social or religious organizations, or in terms of their newness relative to older institutions. Neither quality, however, is satisfactorily definitive, for many cultic movements escape one or both of these classifications, forcing scholars to devote entire chapters to the task of painstakingly qualifying definitions to sufficiently broaden them to incorporate decidedly similar movements with substantial differences of scale or age.

The traditional understanding of the cult, emphasizing heterodoxy as its central characteristic, is both more reliably applicable and useful although it has largely been abandoned by leading cult experts in their effort to maintain neutrality in the ancient contest of the church contra heresy. This effort to lend full cultural and religious legitimacy to this variety of movements which only constitute a single category on the basis of their want of sanction from the greater society: on the basis of their social illegitimacy—has led most cult experts to pursue case-study style research and merely catalog various cults’ practices and doctrines (which are in no way static) to the neglect of structural research regarding their sociological origins which might lend to “unfavorable” descriptions and definitions.

Dr. J. Gordon Melton, a profligate specialist in cults and new religious movements, has characterized the cult phenomenon as the organic “growth of religious pluralism” (xv) in the wake of the “destruction of religious hegemonies” (xv).  This approach only attempts to account for the emergence of those movements that can be thought of as being religious, categorically distinguishing them from decidedly non-religious movements with nevertheless very similar characteristics and cultures, assuming religious and non-religious cults to be distinct phenomena. Furthermore, it’s unable to account for the historical trends in cult activity—boom periods of cult emergence, membership, and importance during periods of prominence for mainstream “religious hegemonies”. Finally, it fails to explain the incidence of various psychological and emotional conditions which are present among cult devotees and participants at greater frequencies than are found to occur in the greater populations of societies. Melton’s temptingly simple description of the cult phenomenon in the terms of a mere market of supply and demand for “new religious innovation” is fundamentally inadequate because it gives no attention to the important psychological component of human behavior (Melton xv).   

This essay will explore a theory regarding the emergence of cult phenomena and sectarianism which posits a widespread crisis of meaning as a necessary condition of cult emergence. Furthermore, I will argue that the fundamental impetuses of these movements are not religious but psychosocial, and that dramatic economic disruptions and acute social crises contribute prominently to their emergence. Finally, I will arrive at a definition of the cult phenomenon through my description of the conditions of their creation. “In other words, we shall assume that the defining of the cult ought not to be separated from theory or theories as to why cults exist” (Eister 321).

The Crisis of Meaning

A sophisticated culture naturally develops the means by which its members can orient themselves in the most basic ways. It composes a system of meaning by which people can come to terms emotionally, intellectually, and spiritually with the world and their lives life in it. Such systems of meaning entail, both, “definitions of the condition of human existence”, as well as the language and symbols in which such definitions are communicated and understood (Eister 322).  A system of meaning “provides the terms on which the human enterprise, can or should, be assumed capable of being carried on” (Eister 324). There are a number of actors in the creation of such systems of orientation; the establishment and adaptation of a meaning system is an organic, culture-wide operation…   

As far as personnel are concerned, “orientational institutions” may include preachers or teachers but one need not be either of these (or be employed within any religious or educational institutions) in order to perform these vital tasks or interact with others in their performance. Painters, poets, editors, novelists, journalists, dramatists, composers and others are equally important participants. And the organizations in which they participate are often neither religious nor educational!” (Eister324)

A theory proposed by social scientists such as Max Weber, Meredith Mcguire, Allan W. Eister, and others propose that cults emerge out of the conditions of cultural crises of meaning. Such crises entail “…dislocations in the orientational and communicational institutions of contemporary societies—and especially in the norms and elements of the communication of ‘meaning’” (Eister 327). Crises of meaning can be caused by dramatic events with widespread effects and ramifications, for example: devastating and widespread disasters, major economic depressions, drastic changes in large sectors of an economy due to new technological innovation or other economic events, the forceful imposition of an alien culture due to a mass migration or globalization, or oppression from an enemy, etc. Religious historian Sidney E. Ahlstrom describes such a crisis during the 1930s’ decade of the Great Depression during which “Sectarian movements arose and strange new cults came into existence—some for the rich, others for the poor” (919)…

Americans of every type sought and found scapegoats and panaceas; racist attitudes and ethnic animosities intensified…Political and religious views gravitated to the extremes; and demagogues often with the cross of Christ on their banners, began to gather their followers…Old popular beliefs collapsed, confidence in the redemptive power of the American way of life faltered, the ‘religion of business’ lost votaries in droves, faith in automatic progress evaporated (920)

Sociologist Meredith Mcguire describes the way in which a meaning system can operate and the way in which it can be invaded and even invalidated—constituting a crisis of meaning—and the dislocating effect of such a crisis in her book The Sociology of Religion:

The meaning system of the individual or group is able to integrate most routine events into an understandable pattern, a meaningful whole. Some events and experiences, however, are not so easily interpreted within the existing meaning system…an entire group can undergo similar meaning-threatening experiences…Such events are particularly meaning-threatening if they appear to contradict important aspects of the existing meaning system… Sometimes a meaning system is completely unable to absorb a crisis experience…the group supports of the entire meaning system may be so weakened by the crisis that people are unable to restore a sense of order and meaning (26).  

In the event of a cultural crisis of meaning, the most basic sensibilities and psychological dispositions—the framework of reality—are uprooted along with the values, identities, religious beliefs, and ethical norms, etc., that they support. The consequence is a critical need for orientation which may become pathological. This state of existential disorientation calls for immediate restructuring of the meaning system “in the face of the nameless terrors of the disordered universe. Only a firm reordering can provide an effective protection against such terror. A new order must be established and maintained continually against the occurrence of further order-threatening phenomena.” (Mcguire 35)

In the wake of a crisis of meaning, an excited and traumatized culture may seek radical solutions or turn to radicals for solutions. The meaning systems which are most distinctly alternative from those which were perceived to be dysfunctional and false will be most attractive to those most traumatized crisis victims.  Paradigm shifts in society, for these reasons, are often eccentric. The sociopaths and eccentrics gain currency during these times especially those who are adept in exploiting the fear and trauma of a culture in crisis. 

                It becomes necessary, if social life is to continue, to establish a new basis of order and a new meaning system. If a group’s way of life has been thoroughly disrupted by a depression, for example, the group might reorganize itself around a social movement (e.g., follower of a new prophet) that offers a new basis of order and meaning for group members. (Mcguire 27)

Incidentally, the fear of repeat meaning crises accounts for the often sectarian character of cults. The effort made by many cults to achieve complete seclusion from the outer world can be understood as an effort to guard the cult’s subculture from further meaning subversion. Such seclusion may entail “physical or symbolic withdrawal from the ‘world’, limiting outside influences (e.g., television or unapproved books, and restricting members’ social contacts. Especially important is the socialization of children; the group protects its children from exposure to competing world views, perhaps by running its own schools…” (Mcguire 31)

Psychological Characteristics of Cult Participants

French psychiatrist Jean-Marie Abgrall is one of a number of scholars who has conducted research on the psychological characteristics of cult participants. His research indicates that, indeed, cult converts are experiencing psychological conditions and stresses that may contribute to their interest in these eccentric social movements. In Soul Snatchers: the Mechanics of Cults, he outlines a psychological profile that is common among cult converts which includes a variety of pathologies which may be associated with the anxiety and panic experienced during crises of meaning and their precipitating events.  He reports that, among those most likely to join a cult are “depressive young people experiencing a feeling of inadequacy, even of revolt” and those feeling “lonely, rejected, and sad”(Abgrall 107). His case-study sample population of 300 people was drawn “from a variety of groups and from a variety of different positions within the groups…including simple participants, people who have attended courses, thoroughly convinced converts, people who have left a cult, and those who are currently in therapy” (Abgrall 106). According to his research 60% of cult members are “depressive” (107).

Likely victims are often exhibit broken or strained social bonds and difficulty with socio-cultural integration…The cults ideal target population is young people who are depressive or who have broken off from their family and society, who feel they cannot handle day-to-day life and who are searching for substitute solutions…Family or social conflicts often contribute to a person’s decision to join a cult. The group is a shelter from the aggression that has been felt and it provides a model of conflict resolution that intellectually satisfies the follower…going into a cult, in such cases, serves a pseudo-therapeutic function.(Abgrall 107)

Abgrall also argues that certain kinds of people are less likely to take interest in a cult. Of those more statistically prone to interest in cults are people between the ages of 18-25, for example. Older adults and more emotionally and psychologically secure individuals participate in cults more rarely. There are several possible explanations for this statistical trend: it may be that older, more experienced, and more secure individuals have more sophisticated, and less severe ways of responding to crises of meaning than cult participation. Also, it may be possible that some experience such crises less powerfully or profoundly than others. The English political philosopher John Plamenanatz discusses meaning systems in his book Man and Society and in it argues that the need for “reliable meanings…is not felt by all men; and is felt by some much more strongly than by others” (xix).   

The Non-Religious Essential Character of Cults

The kinds of needs, for which people turn to cults for satisfaction, appear to be predominantly emotional and psychological, and the cult to which an individual or group suffering a meaning crisis might turn may be either religious or non-religious. The motivating need of the individual can be fulfilled by a variety of meaning systems and doesn’t require any particular religious belief for satisfaction. The important function of cults is to simply meet needs which less flexible institutions are able to meet with their conventional and traditional systems. Even religious cults, therefore, should not be understood as fundamentally religious organizations—though such cults may espouse some kind of transcendental metanarrative as other religious organizations do—because any such religious quality is not a defining characteristic. Contrasting that of a sect, a cult’s theology or core ideology tends to be less sophisticated, less consistent and coherent, less structured and systematic, and less static.

This understanding of the essential nature of cults better accounts for the general homogeneity of cults despite their wide variety of narratives…

…the mosaic of cults that we see today is spreading the word about topics quite unrelated to religion. Gnostic movements predominate in Europe and pseudo-science feeds numerous ideologies. The notion of past lives, extraterrestrial civilizations, extra-sensory powers and so on rarely tie in with religious subtexts… Thus it is fundamental that we define this phenomenon within a framework that excludes religion as a frame of reference (Abgrall 15). 

Defining the Cult

The understanding of cult phenomena as empowered by a kind of psychic trauma will entail that cults must offer distinctly alternative cultures and meaning systems. The particular character of such a meaning system or culture is not consequential provided that it is perceived to be sufficiently exotic by its participants. The need of meaning crisis victims to find a new and reliable meaning system entails escape and complete abandonment of the former. The efforts to exchange one’s most fundamental modes of orientation to the world might entail adopting new speech and thought patterns, new moral convictions and ethics, and new mannerisms—all new sensibilities, in addition to a new world-view.  This aversion to the familiar causes the individual’s attraction to cults, the characteristic zeal of cult participants, and the dramatic personal change associated with brainwashing.

The psychological aversion to the familiar caused by a crisis of meaning creates an escapist culture looking for refuge from a failed meaning system and the institutions and culture to which it belongs. Cults must be culturally and ideologically exotic to provide this refuge. Thus, the traditional conception of cults as strange and unorthodox cultural expatriates has merit. Strangeness is the single common definitive characteristic among cults.  

Works Cited

Abgrall, Jean-Marie. Soul Snatchers: the Mechanics of Cults. New York , NY.: Algora Publishing, 2000.

Ahlstrom , Sidney E., ed. A Religious History of the American People. Second ed. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972.

Eister, Allan W. "An Outline of a Structural Theory of Cults." Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion. 1972. JSTOR. 16/11/2011 . 

Mcguire, Meredith B. Religion: the Social Context. Belmont, CA.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1981.

Melton, J. Gordon. The Encyclopedic Handbook of Cults in America. New York , NY.: Garland Publishing, 1886.

Plamenatz, John. Man and Society. London, UK.: Longman Group, 1963.

Lets Talk About Blame

Here's an odd piece to kick off a new blogging season. Here I'm imitating Gurtrude Stein's (depicted in the Picasso above) modernist poetry (If it's rightly called poetry) for a writing assignment in my "Dirty Thirties" American Literature course. I find myself reading it and wondering about psychology. For instance, psychoanalysts would probably say that you can find things out about yourself--your subconscious motives and whatnot--through this kind of free-styling expression.

It also seems to resemble some of what goes on when a person sleeps. Is the disassociated and seemingly random cognitive activity during sleep a kind of therapy for the mind? If so, maybe these kinds of exercises therapeutic too. Who knows.  

It isn't completely disassociated though, and this makes it somewhat interesting to read (at least for me). It has an aesthetic too (modern art), although it may be contested that my little contribution really counts as "art" at all :). In any case, I enjoyed writing it and I hope you enjoy reading it. 

Lets Talk About Blame

The blood, contained, undrained, kind of like a stranger. How naïve to think of those innocent things.

Bear in mind son, blare in mind, bare your mind, there is a bear in your mind son. Spare your sons. If you dare, wear your sons--tear your sons. 

Take your treasures, Triton is not teased. I had your head once, take mine. Here we are, let’s lunch. Let’s take everything. Lets launch!

Take if you must. I never said I lie. I never said I’d lie and wait forever. 

Your husband is gray. Your husband is gay. Is your husband okay? Let’s play a few bars in the key of sea. Spell yourself carefully. Will it to be. Has it always been this hard to be? Has it been hard to breathe? I seem to cream cheese on the breeze. Please oh please oh please, breathe!

Wheat girl. You so speak treats.  A wave in the sprawling landscape falling swiftly in the untame. God is not sane. God will not be tame and the lovers don’t care what unfair words the guns may say.  

La la la blah blah blah blah. It’s a song. Don’t be jealous of a damn song! Grief. It starts in the key of please.  It’s not a song to be sung lightly or spitely, it’s a song to be sung rightly. Sing with your spleen. Scream.

A hole, a holy hole. Holy hell. Fix your eye on the donut son, not on the whole. Smell it son. Be merciful sun. The word “truth” isn’t spelled with any of your letters, only mine. Smell your letters, they smell fine. Alright?

The Heroic Feminism of Betty Zane

 Here's a research paper I wrote last semester, again, in English Comp I. It's about a Revolutionary War heroine and frontierswoman whose arguments, delivered in the heat of a siege in volunteering to dash 40 yards beyond the safety of the fort to fetch vital gunpowder, portray great courage, both in the face of danger and in the universal struggle of women to preserve their distinct feminine identity in a man's world.  

The third paragraph from the bottom has been thoroughly revised since it was submitted to my instructor to incorporate a thought about sexuality, so if it seems a little out of place, then that's why.

The Heroic Feminism of Betty Zane

            The legend of Betty Zane is a tale of timeless appeal. The story’s central themes of selflessness and sacrificial courage are universally evocative and are regarded as some of the brightest and warmest attributes of humanity: they make us love being human. But beyond its inspirational value, as a historical narrative, Betty’s story also offers observational data regarding the real-life effects of particular attitudes and ideas. In particular, Betty’s sensibilities regarding gender-roles should be of special interest to us because they play a critical role in the circumstances and impetus of her heroism, and they are as much a part of the story as the acts which they frame. In the legend of Elizabeth Zane, nearly as astonishing as Zane’s bold and dangerous dash to fetch vital gunpowder are the arguments she is said to have given to persuade Silas Zane—the commander of Fort Henry and her elder brother, to allow her to run the gauntlet in place of one of the young men (356 Whithers).

            The story is set during the autumn of 1782 at the end of a long Revolutionary war—indeed, Zane Grey, a descendant of Elizabeth Zane, tells of a commemorative monument in present day Wheeling West Virginia which describes the siege of Fort Henry as, “…the last battle of the American Revolution” (vii)—at this time the village of Wheeling had received word from a spy warning that 250 Indians and 40 loyalist soldiers were marching for Wheeling (Whithers 356).

    

            Wheeling, like many other frontier settlements which were illegally settled west of the Proclamation Line of 1763, was under the constant threat of attack by various Indian tribes from the region. In these settlements, forts were often built to provide security and a safe place where villagers could quickly take refuge and defend themselves, often against superior forces. Fort Henry of Wheeling was built in 1774 and was originally named Fort Fincastle in honor of Lord Dunmore, the Virginia colony’s last royal governor. Two years later, however, following the Declaration of Independence, and in the spirit of the Revolution, the fort was renamed “Fort Henry” in honor of Virginia governor and American patriot Patrick Henry (Grey xi-xii). In September of 1782, thirteen years after Fort Henry was built, it was besieged for the second time (Bellesiles 1264).

 

            Betty was only sixteen years old during this second siege of Fort Henry, but even at this early age she already possessed the courage and character of a great pioneer, patriot, and woman (Britannica).  In his book, Chronicles of Border Warfare, historian Lyman Copeland Draper portrays Betty as “…young active and athletic;––with precipitancy to dare danger, and fortitude to sustain her in the midst of it.” (359). She had no sisters, but her five brothers were heroes in their own right, already renown in their time for their own exploits as soldiers and frontiersmen and in their dealings with the Indians (Grey15-16). These great men were prominent figures in Betty’s childhood and they were among the souls who were ultimately saved by Betty’s swiftness and spirit.

   

              On the day of the attack there were only twenty men to defend Fort Henry—less than tenth of the force that opposed them—but the spirits of the men and women of Wheeling were apparently unshaken by the strength their opposition.  When, prior to the attack, Simon Girty, commander of the Indian-loyalist assailants, offered protection to the refugees if they would surrender, he was driven away by gunfire from the fort. During the days of fighting that ensued, all of the Wheeling community was courageously and actively involved in defending Fort Henry (Whithers 357).

  

 Every individual had particular duties to perform; and promptly and faithfully were they discharged. The more expert of the women, took stations by the side of the men; and handling their guns with soldier like readiness, aided in the repulse, with fearless intrepidity. Some were engaged in moulding bullets; others in loading and supplying the men with guns already charged; while the less robust were employed in cooking, and in furnishing to the combatants, provisions and water, during the continuance of the attack.(Whithers 225-226)

 _­­           Both the men and women within Fort Henry fought tirelessly together to save themselves and their children’s lives, but after one day and night of fighting, the supply of gunpowder in the fort was nearly gone. With only enough powder for a few more shots remaining, the situation grew desperate. It became clear that the only way to continue to hold the fort was to retrieve a new supply of gunpowder from the house of Betty’s elder brother, Col. Ebenezer Zane, located about forty yards from the fort (Whithers 356). At this time, while some of the soldiers were deliberating about who should be chosen for the dangerous dash, young Betty Zane spoke up and asked to be permitted to attempt it.

      

            Accounts differ on the precise wording of the arguments which Betty offered to her brother on that day to persuade him to let her go, but among the several varied quotations of Betty’s statements to Captain Silas Zane, a persisting theme is Betty’s frank recognition and courageous acceptance of the gender roles that had been designated by the blank facts of the desperate situation.  “When told that a man would encounter less danger by reason of his greater fleetness, [Betty Zane] replied––‘and should he fall, his loss will be more severely felt. You have not one man to spare;––a woman will not be missed in the defense of the fort.’” (Whithers 359)

Betty’s attitude lacks the blistering sensitivity that, today, has expressed itself by androgynizing the way men and women relate and interact with one another in society. She isn’t shy about her feminine qualities—she flaunts them, incapacities and all. Though, by a surprising error perhaps, she seems to forget to mention her sexuality; it’s a scandalous error to be sure, but it’s refreshing and it makes her heroism all the more impressive. Betty is spectacular, even so in our post-Victorian world where no girl-hero can be adequate without conspicuous breasts and lips; where those most celebrated heroines capture the imagination of wide eyed masses of teenagers with armies of make-up artists, diet and exercise guru’s, digital enhancers, and cosmetic surgeons at their sides. Betty, with her frumpy name and her yards of underwear fabric, is a model of feminine heroism. And she isn't aware of a “man’s world”: she isn’t a reactionary against male chauvinism, but she is well aware of the differences between men and women and without apology she is excellently woman.   

 Her story ultimately demonstrates the usefulness of such a disposition when, against all odds, she survives the return trip from the house of Col. Ebenezer Zane, passing through the gates of Fort Henry with her precious burden.  A commonly attested detail of the story is that not a single shot was fired at her during her sprint to the house of Ebenezer Zane; instead of firing their weapons the Indians took notice of her gender, shouting “a squaw! a squaw!”. The Indian and British loyalists only began to fire at her when they saw her returning from her brother’s house bound for the fort with a fresh supply of gunpowder in her possession (Whithers 359). There is good reason to doubt that a man would have received this same passive treatment.  Her chances of surviving the dash appear to have been at least twice as good as those that one of the men might have faced if he were to have attempted the trip. 

 Elizabeth Zane’s bold deed remains fixed in American legend, but her heroism extends beyond mere actions. Fort Henry and the men and women of Wheeling owe their gratitude to Betty’s feminine self understanding, to her heroic affirmation of womanhood implicit in her readiness to admit the differences that distinguish women from men and the roles for which these differences naturally prefer them.   

Works Cited

Bellesiles, Michael. "Wheeling, West Virginia." Encyclopedia of the American Revolution: Library of Military History. Ed. Harold E. Selesky. Vol. 2. Detroit: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2006. Gale Virtual Reference Library. Web. 16 Mar. 2011.

"Betty Zane." Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Encyclopædia     Britannica, 2011. Web. 05 Apr. 2011.

Grey, Zane. “Betty Zane.” Champaign, Ill.: Project Gutenberg, 2004. Net Library. Web. 16 Mar. 2011.

Whithers, Alexander Scott, and Lyman Copeland Draper. “Chronicles of Border Warfare.” A New Edition. Cincinnati, Oh. : The Robert Clarke Company, 1895. Project Gutenberg. E-book. 16Mar. 2011 

Declaration of Independence from Chronocentrism

This is a paper that I enjoyed writing for my honors comp 1 class; it's written in the Jeffersonian 18th century style and modeled after the Declaration of Independence (obviously). 

My Declaration

When in rational pursuit of the truth, it is found to be necessary that any man should amend his own intellectual habits by which ideas are estimated, and presume no superiority for the ideological fashions of his time beyond that which their own merit and the unbiased reason itself will permit, a due respect for the customs of the discipline of thought demands that he declare the causes which impel him to such a position.

I hold these truths to be self evident that, in all times, minds are created with the equal faculty to know the truth, and that their power of reason, the which endowed by their creator, holds them under obligation by certain unalienable duties, that among these are intellectual honesty, diligence, and the pursuit of truth. These duties entail that man should govern his mind with constant vigilance such that when a persuasion becomes itself an impediment to these ends, his duty is to rebut and rebuke it, and to prefer more sound and just attitudes which shall be more effectual to the advancement of the true objects of the reason, and if such a fallacious persuasion should publically prevail, to earnestly advocate for its correction. Courtesy dictates that contention and criticism should not be obtruded against prevalent attitudes for purposes of minor consequence, but when such dispositions so pervasively and densely cloud thought and obstruct truth and threaten to reduce multitudes under manifest and bigoted delusion, then such critical opposition is not merely warranted but demanded by all justice and truth.  Such is the condition, very often, of the modern western man that ignorance and prejudice against the institutions and intuitions of the past and of its orthodoxies, and the submission to intellectual fashion have inhibited the very mechanics of the reason and often blinded its victims to the verity of the most obvious and demonstrable first philosophies. But let the proceeding facts utter their own unadorned accusations against modern chronocentrism that the rectitude of this declaration may be unmistakable.

 It has often lured western nations into meddling amongst the affairs of those civilizations whose values and institutions they have unjustly deemed to be vestigial, detestable, and beneath their dignity without the sufficient understanding or rational deliberation that is due for such a judgment.

It has often possessed us to unjustly force ourselves upon these nations to subject and govern them under our unauthorized rule or under the rule of despots whom we have appointed.

It has often emboldened us with arrogant and foolish confidence such that we rashly distain tradition and the wisdom of our ancestors, scorning their customs, and inviting all perdition and error providing only that it be of a novel and untraditional variety.  

It has often incited adolescent audacity, deliberate ignorance, and an unwarranted confidence in the quality of our own doctrines, institutions, cultures, and governments that we are even possessed of the impetus to exhume our defenseless forefathers in order that we may take them to task for their sins and desecrate them.   

It has, by the power of a mob and through democratic tyranny oppressed and crushed under foot some who have not ceased to respect tradition.      

It has widely stunted the due curiosity and appreciation of ancient thoughts and dialectics, it has also greatly narrowed our interest in history; it draws us only to those most present memories, leading us to widely forget or revise the greatest of stories, myths, and legends and the richness of predeceased cultures, or remember and love only those which remind us of ourselves and of our own birth.  

Its narcissism has vulgarized both man and God by the disfigurement of their relation one to another: it has vulgarized God by revising His image so that He might be worthy of us and of our great modern sensibilities, and in so doing, as God’s creature, man has also been vulgarized, for he is no longer the creation of a god, but a creation of his own hand.   

It has invited the abuse of reason herself and the violation of her true purpose by widely encouraging frivolous appetites for mere intellectual fashion and amusement.  

It has often deformed truth and justice by tempting us to design them afresh, and by teaching us to reject, in all cases whatsoever, those time-honored things which have known to be true and just.

It has opposed true democracy and unjustly sought to vest unbalanced power and authority in the members of the small oligarchy of men who, by chance, presently happen to be living.

I judge it to be true that if time has indeed favored anyone, then such favor must belong those who take counsel with the dead; it must belong to those who most honor the events and peoples of the past by clearly knowing, understanding, and learning from them. It must belong to those who most humbly and fairly consider the merits and faults of bygone cultures with the same fair-mindedness by which they consider those of their own. No culture is inherently superior, and time has no prejudices; having the capacity for great humanity or great brutishness is the natural condition of all men and of these capacities time is no corollary.

  Therefore, by the same natural power of reason which has been vested in all men, whose obvious purpose is the true and accurate knowledge, inference, and understanding of its perceptions, and by which error and inaccuracy are implied both, to be, and to be its antithesis, I solemnly declare my objection, renunciation, and resolution to be independent from all chronocentric prejudice of thought and belief, and admit no natural superiority in quality for men of any age or culture but confess equality among them all, and to this conviction, and against vanity and conceit, I pledge all of the vigilance and integrity that I possess.

Jason Paone

Another shock from the defibrillator

     It's been over six months since anything has been published around here and the last post wasn't even something that I wrote. Clearly this is no way to keep a weblog or readers around, but I'm not going to abuse your eyeballs with the kind of silly apologetic fawning that we've all seen in the comeback posts of amateur bloggers (like myself) before Facebook's blurt became the preferable medium of social exchange and expression.

    Instead, I'll introduce you to a new genre of literature that will most likely become the staple around here. Allow me to introduce the great essay: the most abundant literature on my computer, and probably the only content that I will be able to consistently post for a while.

    Feel free to hack them up; I would be glad for some critical feedback and an opportunity to improve my academic writing. Seriously, don't be gentle with me. 

The Balnibarbian Heresies

By J. Budziszewski
   Far away on the other side of the world is a marvelous land named Balnibarbi. As you may have learned from Guliver's Travels, its capital is the great city of Lagado, and in this place is an even greater Academy, filled with the most brilliant people in the world. Unfortunately, Mr. Gulliver was able to stay at Lagado Academy for only a short while, and there were many interesting things about the Academy that he did not have a chance to discover. Having recently taken the opportunity for a longer visit, I offer my findings to you.

    The oldest and most honorable department in the entire Academy of Lagado is devoted to the study of color. Indeed, the philosophy of color has been studied in Balnibarbi for something like twenty-four centuries. It was the Balnibarbian scholars, for instance, who discovered that all of the colors in the universe come from just three primaries-yellow, red, and blue. The details are well known even in our part of the world: orange is derived from red and yellow, green from blue and yellow, purple from blue and red, and so on. Of course the primary colors themselves are not derived from anything.
  
     Unfortunately, over the last few hundred years the great tradition of Balnibarbian color philosophy has degenerated, as wave upon wave of intellectual revolution has swept the Lagado Academy. Those few scholars who still believe in the doctrine of primary colors are now considered reactionary, retrograde, regressive--in a word, uncool. The three main parties of reform are the Monochromes, the Antichromes, and the Neochromes.
  
     The Monochromes object to the theory of primary colors because they do not think it goes far enough. In their view, it's all well and good to say that orange comes from the primary colors red and yellow, purple from the primary colors red and blue, and so on-- but what, they ask, is the ultimate basis of color? They reason that there must be an even more primary color than yellow, red or blue--a fundamental color from which even the primary colors are derived. For instance, some of the Monochromes think the color from which all colors come is chartreuse. Others think it puce. The latest Monochromes identify it as plaid.  Although these theories have disappointing consequences for interior decorating, they are bold and original, and to be bold and original is of course the goal of scholarship.
  
     The Antichromes are the next party. Although they too reject the theory of primary colors, with their keener rods and cones they see right through the Monochromes. Chartreuse couldn't be the fundamental color, they observe, because all one can derive from it is various shades of greenish-yellow. Likewise puce couldn't be the fundamental color, because all one can derive from it is various shades of purplish-brown. Finally, plaid couldn't be the fundamental color because it isn't a color at all.
  
     The truth, say the Antichromes, is that there is no fundamental color from which even the primary colors can be derived. This is the crux. For if there is no fundamental color, then color has no Ultimate Basis; and if color has no Ultimate Basis, then color isn't real. This logic is so far beyond previous semblances of reason that it might almost be considered a new logic altogether. Its conclusions are equally breathtaking: everything that we call a color is just a figment of our imagination, a projection of some desperate human desire onto a universe of cold and unvarying gray. For discovering the tragic truth, expressed in their motto, "Color is Dead," the Antichromes are rightly praised as pioneers. They eat only burnt toast and milk, and watch only black-and-white television.
  
     Finally we come to the Neochromes, the most avant-garde party of all. They agree with the Antichromes that color has no Ultimate Basis; they agree that the universe is gray, the experiences of hue and tint existing only in our imaginations; they agree that we create the blue of the night and the blush of the rose in our minds, rather than somehow discovering them in the order of things. But what, they ask, is so tragic about that? Is it not liberating? Smash the palettes! Pulverize the prisms! Away with the tyranny of yellow, red, and blue! The creator of color is MAN!
  
     Filled with revolutionary passion, the Neochromes, like the Monochromes, divide into factions. Some Neochromes say that every human being is entitled to his own primary colors. Other Neochromes object that permitting every human being his own primary colors would lead to difficulty with traffic signals and things of that sort; although every country is entitled to its own primary colors, they say, individuals must toe the line. In the end, however, communitarianism comes to pretty much the same thing as individualism because no two communitarians can ever agree upon the spectrum their country should use. In a sort of compromise, they usually wind up mixing all the colors together and painting everything a tepid shade of brown. Even so they quarrel over whether it should be sepia, beige, or taupe.
    
     We too have a great tradition. Just as the Balnibarbians learned long ago that all color in the universe is derived from just a few primary colors, so we learned long ago that all moral law in the universe is derived from just a few primary moral laws. Just as the primary colors are the same for everyone, so these moral laws are the same for everyone. Just as the primary colors are recognized by all who hear of them, so these  laws are recognized by all who hear of them. Just as the primary colors do not have to be derived from anything because they are the source of the other colors, so the natural laws do not have to be derived from anything because they are the source of the other moral laws. And just as the Balnibarbians have lost their ancient wisdom about color, so we have lost our ancient wisdom about morality. The colorblind lead the colorblind.
    
      In the first place we have thinkers who treat moral law as the Monochromes treat color. They insist on some ultimate value which they rank as even more fundamental than the natural law. As to what this ultimate value is, they divide, some naming pleasure, some naming liberty, some naming another value, such as privacy. Despite all their disagreement, these thinkers have one thing in common: any moral law that cannot be traced to their ultimate value they simply ignore. In this way they manage to ignore quite a bit.
  
      In the second place some of our thinkers treat moral law as the Antichromes treat color. They insist that there is no real good and evil, no real right and wrong, and that the universe is merely an enormous screen onto which we project our desires and call them moral laws. According to Friedrich Nietzsche, the mentor of this dementia, God is dead, therefore everything is permitted.

     Finally we have thinkers who treat moral law as the Neochromes treat color. Just as Neochromes think that human beings can create new primary colors, so these thinkers insist that human beings can create new and different moralities. Of course, this is absurd. If someone claimed to have created new primary colors, you could be sure that he had merely made a new blend of the old ones, and the same is true for the primary principles of good and evil.
    
      For instance, you can make up a new rule that killing infants is right instead of wrong. Nobody can stop you. But if you want to get pregnant young women to believe it, the only way to do so is to confuse them about the moral laws they already know--to tell them, for instance, that it isn't really killing but that it is somehow compassionate and prudent. Is it clear how this works? It is just like a painter who likes to primary colors, dislikes the third and, after a little mixing, claims to have invented a new one.

Does the Sexual Doctrine of the Law of Love Make Sense?

A logical critique

The target of this post is to analyze the doctrine of The Law of Love and its premises from a non-theological perspective, judging the sensibility of its supporting premises and the logical consistency and coherency of its arguments in their own right and without respect to any Christian doctrines or theology. The first two posts in this series have criticized The Law of Love with arguments which were based on other Christian assumptions like the authority and validity of the Bible, and the nature of marriage etc, but this post will not invoke any theology or Christian doctrine. This post will feature only the claims and arguments that The Law of Love itself makes. The question that I’m concerned with in this post can be put simply in this way: does the sexual doctrine of The Law of Love make sense?

The Law of Love literature which most famously features The Family’s doctrine of extramarital sex is really a kind of social philosophy. Other Family publications that make reference to the Law of Love often stress that the sexual aspect of The Law of Love is not the primary subject of this doctrine which is really an ethic. Sex is significant in the doctrine of The Law of Love as a social manifesto because it is perceived to be useful to the end of achieving The Law of Love’s social ideal.

David Berg believed that sex has long been misunderstood by the Christian west, and that it has uses which go beyond procreation and the marriage bed. In The Law of Love’s social sexuality, the body is not personal property and neither is sex the property of marriage, but both, belonging to The Lord, are to be used for the unification and well being of the community. The Law of Love offers a model for society in which sex is a kind of social adhesive, creating inter-family unit cohesion.

I wanted to mention that part of the premise for The Law of Love’s social sexuality is not so unorthodox. For instance, the idea that the body is not one’s own property and that sex’s purpose is social—I think most Christian faith traditions would find these two statements to be fairly agreeable. I believe that the major disagreement is centered on these two fundamental issues:

1.     Sex’s telos, the purpose for which sex was designed.

2.     The ways in which sex can and ought to be used in society.

Point number 1 is a principally a theological issue, but point 2 is not strictly theological. The Law of Love (and related Family literature), argues for a number of special and unusual uses for sex. These arguments are subject to the rules of logic and common sense. In other words, The Law of Love’s conclusions about how sex can be used are arrived at by logical methods which are either correct or incorrect and they are based upon premises that are either true or false. My goal in this post is to consider those arguments and their methods and evaluate the truth of their premises.              

To answer the question in the title of this post—“Does the doctrine of the law of love make sense?”—I’m going to scrutinize three arguments that are used to support three uses of sex that The Law of Love proposes. The Law of Love is a model for society in which sex is used as a social adhesive and a charitable community resource, but if these arguments aren’t sound, then their conclusions could only be true by accident. Likewise if these arguments aren’t sound then the law of love’s sex doctrine is also unsound and The Law of Love’s practice of extramarital sex could only be morally correct by accident.

I’ve known many people who, whether they practice the doctrine or not, seem to view the sexual doctrine of The Law of Love as having a very noble purpose. Surely this view is reasonable if these assumptions about sex are correct. If sex can do the things that The Law of Love claims, then The Law of Love must be very useful; if sex is as important to health and well being as we are told, then The Law of Love must be very charitable. And if sex is capable of saving people from loneliness then my friends are right, The Law of Love must be of very noble intent. But if sex doesn’t work in those ways, then the act of extramarital sex can’t have the value that The Law of Love ascribes to it and those who ascribe to it have been mislead.

Let’s get cracking! The following are three uses of sex which are fundamental to the doctrine of the law of love; these are some of the ways that the law of love uses sex…

©       As a tool for achieving special unity, strong interpersonal relationships, and group cohesion.

©       As a charitable act to meet the unsatisfied biological needs of the undersexed.

©       As a remedy for loneliness.

Now I’m going to do my best to clearly articulate the arguments that The Law of Love makes in support of these unique uses of sex.

(Note) There are a few technical terms which are used in this post that have very specific meanings with respect to the disciplines of Logic and Critical Thought. Logical validity and soundness, for instance, are two terms that I will repeatedly use. If you aren’t already familiar with these terms then you can read about them at this website: http://www.iep.utm.edu/val-snd/

Charitable Sex

(Sex as an act of philanthropy)

1.     Christians ought to be charitable: giving what is in their power to give to those who are in need of it. 

2.     Human beings need sex in the same way that they need food, sleep, and exercise.

3.     There are people who don’t naturally get enough sex, and so, are in need of it.

Conclusion: Christians ought to make themselves sexually available, when it is in their power to do so, to people who need sex.

 I believe that this argument is the most important that the law of love offers. If sex has the capacity to be used charitably then not only is it easy to see how sex is an important social tool, but also how the law of love really is a Christian doctrine.

The main problem that I find with this argument concerns the truth of premise 2. Is it really true that human beings need sex in the same way that they need food, sleep, and exercise? Is sex really necessary to life and health the way that food, sleep, and exercise are? In what sense can this possibly be true?

There are clear and adverse effects to a body that does not sleep, eat, or exercise, while there is no clear evidence that sexual abstinence poses any threat to health. On the contrary, sexual abstinence may be an effective way to avoid many real health risks. Furthermore we have at our disposal numerous examples of people (and no lack of Christians) who have chosen a life of sexual abstinence for some reason or other and do so without any report of mal health.

The argument for sex as a meaningful charitable act relies heavily on the assumption that sex is in some way essential to health. But we have no reason to treat sex as an emotional or biological necessity. I’m not denying that there are certain health benefits associated with a healthy sex life, but to say “sex is healthy” is a very different thing than saying “health depends on sex”, or that sexually abstinent people can’t also enjoy good health.  

Premise 2 is clearly false; our “need” for sex can’t be compared to our need for food, sleep, or exercise, so the argument for charitable sex is unsound. But is there a way that this argument could work without assuming that sex is a biological requirement? Can sex still be a meaningful act of charity if it doesn’t fulfill any biological needs? Let’s revise the argument and see…

1.     Christians ought to be charitable: giving what is in their power to give to those who are in need of it. 

2.     Human beings need like sex. in the same way that they need food, sleep, and exercise.

3.     There are people who don’t naturally get enough as much sex as they would like, and so, are in need of desire it.

Conclusion: Christians ought to make themselves sexually available, when it is in their 
power to do so, to people who need sex.

If the argument was valid before, it certainly isn’t now. That is, the conclusion doesn’t follow necessarily from the premises. It may be possible to make a more modest argument which argues for the possibility of sexual charity as a concept--although much more eminently important forms of charity abound which do satisfy unmet biological requirements. But this argument which argues for the existence of a moral responsibility to satisfy the needs of the undersexed is logically unsound.

  Sex as a remedy for loneness

1.     Christians ought to be charitable: giving what is in their power to give to those who are in need of it. 

2.     People need companionship.

3.     Some people don’t have a personal companion, and so, are deprived of companionship.

4.     Having sex with a person assuages loneliness and provides companionship.

Conclusion: Christians ought to make themselves sexually available, when possible, to people who don’t have a personal companion and who suffer from loneliness. 

I know that I’m no expert when it comes to matters of the heart, but premise 4 seems very dubious to me. I doubt that sex is really what a lonely heart desires; clearly what a lonely person needs is companionship. But maybe someone will argue, “Do you deny that a person can experience companionship while having sex?” Well no, I agree that a person is more likely to experience companionship while having sex than he would while spending time alone, but this fact isn’t only true for sexual acts. This same argument can be made for any activity that involves two or more people: “Christians ought to play checkers, when possible, with people who suffer from loneliness”.

People don’t need to be having sex to keep each other company, and if shared company is what alleviates loneliness then I don’t see what sex adds to the solution in the first place. 

But then again, sometimes people want a special kind of companionship: not just someone to play checkers with, but someone to share a romantic love with. In this case I still don’t see what sex by itself can do. When a person wants romantic love (Eros), sex alone still isn’t sufficient. They still need a person to love and belong to, not just a person to perform sex with.

   Sex gains its meaning and all of the romance with which we imbue it when it is practiced between a man and woman who belong to each other. On its own, sex, after all, is nothing but a biological function of the body that even the insects perform; it’s the context of sex that makes it so special, or so vulgar, or so plainly biological.

If sex could remedy loneliness on its own, then we would have to change our attitude about prostitution and the idea that “you can’t buy happiness”.   

The argument for sex as a remedy for loneliness relies on a premise that is naively ignorant of the nature of love, sex, loneliness, and of human emotions (apparently more so than I am). It also isn’t logically sound or valid. Sex is not the same thing as love, romance, and companionship, and it’s a poor substitution for those things.

Sex for Greater Unity

1.     It is good for Christians to strive to live in love and unity with one another.

2.     Sex engenders unity between people when it is practiced in accordance with The Law of Love.

Conclusion:  To use sex (in accordance with the guidelines of The Law of Love) to achieve love and unity in a community is good and right.

Let’s suppose, for the sake of the argument, that premise 2 is correct, and that sex can create a bond of unity between its two subjects who have practiced it in accordance with The Law of Love. In this case the conclusion still doesn’t follow by necessity from the premises. Even if sex can do what The Law of Love claims, it is not necessarily good and right that sex should be used for such a purpose. I suspect that the most important reasons why sex ought not to be used to create social cohesion the way that The Law of Love proposes are theological, but I promised at the beginning of this post not to appeal to theology so I won’t discuss them. But there are other strictly logical reasons why this argument’s conclusion doesn’t follow from the premises. For instance, let’s assume that premise 2 is true: let’s assume that when extramarital sex is practiced in accordance with The Law of Love, greater unity is always the result. Before the new doctrine can go on the market we need to test for error. We need to have an accurate idea about how the doctrine will perform in society before it is made available to the public. We need to know how often people will fail to practice it correctly, and what will be the consequences for such malpractice. It may be that in attempting to practice such a doctrine so many would fail to practice it correctly that the harm which would result in terms of divorces and broken homes would be too great for this doctrine to be worth attempting. But this is just one example that is meant to show that the argument “Sex for Greater Unity” isn’t logically valid. 

And although I didn’t address the validity premise 2 at all, it isn’t because I don’t find it to be very doubtful. I suspect that this is yet another overextension of sex’s abilities and correct uses. And if sex were such a social utility as The Law of Love apparently believes it to be, I wonder why The Family has been the only society to think of it.  

As a side note, it seems to be a common approach to evaluate The Law of Love by how it functions in theory: to talk about the things it can do in the ideal situation. This approach seems to be essentially flawed because The Law of Love is not intended to be applied in theory but in a real society full of imperfect people and non-ideal situations. If The Law of Love can’t work in a real society, then it’s useless to us. So it’s useless to evaluate this doctrine in abstract, its value is connected to its usefulness to us. For example: it doesn’t matter if a miracle drug can, in theory, cure cancer if it kills all or most of the people to whom it is administered.

*Bonus feature*

I want to also mention an argument that may not belong strictly to The Law of Love itself but seems to be a popular defense of the doctrine no less.

 This is one of my personal favorites, I call it “The Evolutionary Argument” and it goes something like this…

The Evolutionary Argument

1.       People (men in particular) are not designed for monogamy as illustrated by our powerful desire for extramarital sex.

2.       To prevent the body from performing its polyamorous function is unnatural and unreasonable.

Conclusion: Extramarital sex is normal and natural behavior that shouldn’t be discouraged or prevented.

This is an argument that I have heard with surprising frequency and has usually been articulated by young men.

What surprises me about this argument are its underlying assumptions. For one, it doesn’t assume any Christian doctrines about the body or about marriage, and seems to assume a very evolutionary theory about human sexuality (which is an unusual idea for a Family member to be in possession of). It also acts strangely (almost nihilistically) ignorant of reasons why people (both Christians and non-Christians [but especially Christians]) ought to, and in fact do, routinely deny their biological impulses from having authority over their person and behavior  This argument with its hidden assumptions can be easily modified to argue in favor of things like rape. 

But back to a logical perspective, both of the supporting premises of this argument are very questionable and presume a number of underlying assumptions that are purely theoretical themselves. The premises of this argument need their own arguments, and the hidden presuppositions need to be substantiated and supported as well. This argument also “begs the question” by assuming the conclusion to be true in premise 1: that people aren’t meant to be monogamous. This is the equivalent to saying that people are meant to be polyamorous which is essentially the same proposition that is made in the conclusion.

Closing argument

I’ve taken my time in previous posts to theologically evaluate The Law of Loves sex doctrine, but to what rigors is it really necessary to subject an argument that is itself logically flawed at the start? The sexual doctrine of the law of love can’t stand on its own two feet so it needs no defeater. Its arguments don’t make sense and their conclusions: the proposed ways in which sex can be used for good, are unfounded. We have no good reason to believe that sex can be a meaningful act of charity, or that sex can or should be used to create social harmony, or that sex alone is a functional solution for loneliness as The Law of Love claims. I want to close this post with two open ended questions:

1.       What meaning is left in the practice of extramarital sex?

2.       What purpose does this act accomplish if not the ones which The Law of Love claims?